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Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of
Political Branch Interpretive Assets
James J. Brudneyt
INTRODUCTION
As a legislation scholar, Philip Frickey was present at the creation.I Along
with his coauthor William Eskridge, Frickey reconceptualized the field of
legislation and statutory interpretation. In doing so, he opened the door to an
unparalleled period of inquiry and debate about the meaning of statutes, among
both judges and academics. The Eskridge and Frickey casebook, published in
1988,2 was justly hailed by Judge Richard Posner as having "done for
legislation what Hart and Sacks did for legal process, or Hart and Wechsler for
federal courts: it has demonstrated the existence of a subject."3
Over the ensuing two decades, Frickey has been at once a major
contributor to and an essential chronicler of developments in this field.4 A
Copyright C 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
t Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law. I am grateful to Bill Eskridge and Steve Huefner for valuable comments on an
earlier draft, to Melanie Oberlin for extraordinary research assistance, and to Jennifer Pursell for
excellent secretarial support. The Moritz College of Law contributed generous financial
assistance.
1. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 128 (14th ed. 1968) ("Had I been present
at the creation, I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe."
Alfonso X (The Wise) (1221-1284)).
2. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION (1988) [hereinafter CASEBOOK]. The Casebook is now in its fourth edition, with
Elizabeth Garrett as an additional coauthor. Page references in this Essay are to the fourth edition,
published in 2007.
3. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1988). Posner's glowing
review also described the casebook as "far and away the best set of teaching materials on the
subject of legislation that has ever been published" and as having "the potential to alter the law
school curriculum." Id. at 1567. Posner did express mild disappointment at the authors' omission
of certain passages from Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, among others, notwithstanding
the laudable overall treatment of theoretical approaches to interpretation. Id. at 1570 & n.4.
4. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1971
(2005) [hereinafter Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change]; Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor ofIrving Younger, 84 MINN. L.
REv. 199 (1999) [hereinafter, Frickey, Revisiting the Revival]; Philip P. Frickey, From the Big
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hallmark of his scholarship has been an appreciation for complexity-for the
tensions and convergences between theory and practice in statutory
interpretation, and for the historical, institutional, and normative perspectives
that judges, lawyers, social scientists, and legal academics bring to the
interpretive enterprise.
This Essay examines Frickey's treatment of the canons of construction, an
aspect of his attentiveness to complexity. Two general themes emerge from the
discussion and analysis in a number of Frickey's articles. One is his effort to
unmask: he critically assesses descriptive claims that the canons promote more
predictable construction of statutes, as well as normative claims that they foster
more neutral policy outcomes. The second theme is Frickey's effort to
understand and justify: he views the canons as performing a useful role for the
judiciary as an institution in certain settings. Ultimately, Frickey defends the
canons as an institutional resource, but in more reserved terms than those
offered by canon enthusiasts.6
The Essay then expands upon Frickey's concerns by presenting two sets
of observations that focus on how the canons differ from legislative history and
agency guidance. Based on these observations, the Essay suggests that the
canons should be subordinated to interpretive resources produced by the
institutions of Congress and the executive.
My first set of observations involves legitimacy and stems from our
separation-of-powers understanding that in the statutory domain, federal courts
are expected to act as agents of the politically accountable branches.7 Article I
of the Constitution authorizes Congress to organize itself in fulfillment of its
legislative mission8 and requires Congress to publish a record of its legislative
proceedings.9 Although the Founders did not anticipate judicial review of
Sleep to the Big Heal: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241
(1992).
5. See, e.g., supra note 4; Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The
Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early
Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene];
Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, The Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, IlIYALE L.J. 1707 (2002); Philip P. Frickey,
Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085 (1995) [hereinafter Frickey, Faithful
Interpretation]; see also Frickey, infra notes 16, 37, 50, 52, 100, 102, and 103.
6. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAw 25-29 (1997); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING
THE REGULATORY STATE 147-57 (1990); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 943-45 (1992).
7. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 3 (2009); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865-66 (1984); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-16 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .").
9. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
[Vol. 98:11991200
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statutes as that process has developed, their Article I contribution helped create
two notable innovations in legislative design that are relevant to how courts
should approach statutory interpretation. These design innovations, dating from
the earliest Congresses, were the determination to favor detailed public
reporting of floor debates and the decision to create permanent standing
committees that produced oral and then written committee reports.10 Taken
together, these innovations led to the development of legislative history as a
means of informing and persuading members of Congress regarding the bills on
which they were to vote.
Canons lack any comparable constitutional foundation. As creations of the
judicial branch, their contribution was not anticipated within the
constitutionally prescribed structure of federal lawmaking. Nor-unlike
legislative history-was their functional role in the lawmaking process
recognized by the early Congresses. In addition, current evidence suggests
that-again unlike legislative history-the canons are largely unknown to or
ignored by the legislators and staff who draft, negotiate, and vote on statutory
text." Because the canons' interpretive validity is fundamentally disconnected
from the Article I lawmaking structure and the realities of the legislative
process, there is reason to question whether courts should value canons to the
same extent as interpretive resources produced by Congress.12
My second set of observations involves reliability. The Court's
interpretive rubric has given rise to a relatively objective internal hierarchy for
contextual resources produced by Congress and also by the executive branch.
Certain types of legislative history and agency directives are presumptively
valued more than others.13 Judicial deviations from this hierarchy tend to be
accompanied by some explanation for the departure.' 4 Importantly, the
priorities established for legislative history and agency directives flow from
how Congress and the executive function, both in terms of relying on
authoritative sources of expertise and valuing deliberative processes.
and from time to time publish the same .... ").
10. See infra, Part II.B.1-2.
11. See infra, Part II.B.4.
12. Cf EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 151-67 (2008) (discussing why
canons are a third-order resource, to be invoked only when enactable preferences cannot be
inferred and enactor preferences cannot be estimated). Given assigned word limitations, this Essay
does not explore comparable ways in which interpretive resources produced by the executive
branch may also be constitutionally grounded in the lawmaking process. For a preliminary
suggestion that the Founders anticipated an interpretive role for agency officials, see infra note
160. For in-depth discussion of agency approaches to statutory interpretation between 1787 and
the Civil War, see Jerry L. Mashaw & Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the
Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 7 (2009) and Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering
American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006).
13. See infra Parts II.C.1-2.
14. See id
2010]1 1201
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By contrast, there is no recognized ordering of authority within the
canonical universe. The Court has never developed rules for harmonizing or
prioritizing among the scores of existing canons, many of which the Court has
created in recent decades.' 5 One language canon may trump another, one
substantive canon may displace another, and a language canon may be deemed
subservient to a substantive canon in one instance and dominant in the next.
This lack of an intelligible framework for ordering the canons renders them
distinctly more susceptible to judicial manipulation than other interpretive
resources.
Part I of this Essay discusses Frickey's treatment of the canons. Part II
builds on Frickey's insights to raise and develop my comparative institutional
observations. These observations suggest subordinating the canons to other
interpretive resources that are at once more legitimately grounded in the
lawmaking process and more genuinely objective.
I
PROFESSOR FRICKEY AND THE CANONS
Although this Part examines Frickey's treatment of the canons from a
doctrinal rather than a chronological perspective, his approach has evolved over
two decades. Frickey initially focused more on whether the canons promote
rule-of-law values,' 6 whereas in later writings he addressed the canons' role in
furthering institutional, strategic behavior by courts.17 Frickey has always
expressed a degree of skepticism about claims made by canons proponents, but
he now seems more ambivalent in normative terms than he was earlier in his
career.
A. Frickey 's Skepticism About the Canons
1. Language Canons and Predictability
Language canons are generally justified as background, interpretive norms
that embody conventional usage-"plausible or even irresistible judgments
about how words should ordinarily be understood."18 Such judgments are
supposed to help courts to determine why a statutory provision includes certain
words configured in a particular order, or what relationship exists between the
15. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at app. B (listing more than one hundred substantive
canons used by Rehnquist Court); infra Part II.C.3 (discussing absence of hierarchy among the
canons).
16. See William N. Eskridge & Philip Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 27, 65-67 (1994); Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra
note 5, at 1090-91; Frickey, Revisiting the Revival, supra note 4, at 206-07.
17. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 5, at 1714-16; Frickey, Interpretative-Regime
Change, supra note 4, at 1986-92; Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5, at 450-61.
18. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 150.
1202 [Vol. 98:1199
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included words and identical or different language found in other parts of the
same or perhaps separate statutes.1 Canon supporters maintain that these
linguistic judgments are presumptively shared by those who regularly draft and
approve legislative text2 and also by those who seek to conform their conduct
21to directives set forth in that text. Insofar as the legislative community and the
general public invoke considerations of ordinary meaning when enacting or
complying with statutes, judicial reliance on such conventional usages is said to
promote greater predictability in statutory interpretation.
Professor Frickey is not persuaded. In his succinct essay titled Faithful
22Interpretation, Frickey maintains that the concept of ordinary or conventional
meaning rests on the dubious assumption that statutes are or can be largely self-
defining.23 Although predictability and clarity are values prized as part of the
interpretive enterprise, they can never be the whole story. Because statutes are
"instruments of practical contextual communication," faithful interpretation
requires that courts adjust the scope and precision of rights or privileges
conferred-or duties imposed-in light of novel or unforeseeable
circumstances.24 Further, given that statutes also are "instruments of... social
governance," faithful interpretation requires that courts remain sensitive to
extrinsic public law values, including those emanating from the Constitution.25
Frickey's insistence that statutes be construed as far more than linguistic
puzzles comports with the perspectives of key players in the lawmaking
process such as members of Congress, their staffs, and executive branch
participants. Neither the legislators who enact statutes nor the citizens and
businesses that seek to abide by them rely primarily on their own linguistic
judgments embodying notions of ordinary or conventional meaning. Most
public laws in our complex regulatory state are written to be interpreted and
understood by legal experts rather than laypersons.26
19. See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 2, app. B at 19-23 (discussing inter alia the
canons of noscitur a sociis and expressio unius, the Whole Act rule, the presumption against
redundancy, and the presumption of statutory consistency with respect to the same or similar
terms).
20. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (interpreting inconclusive text by looking for "which meaning is [the] most in accord
with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole
Congress which voted on the words of the statute") (emphasis in original).
21. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 59, 65 (1988) (concluding that court's role is to "look at the statutory
structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable
user of words"); see generally, Nix v. Heddon, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (concluding that "in
the common language of the people," tomatoes were a covered vegetable, not an exempt fruit,
under 1883 Tariff Act).
22. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 1089.
25. Id.
26. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Why Linguistics?, 73 WASH U. L.Q. 1047, 1051-
2010] 1203
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An example from the National Labor Relations Act illustrates this point.
When Congress declares that employers may not "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce" employees' efforts to join or support unions,2 7 it does so anticipating
that such statutory commands will acquire meaning through diagnostic and
prescriptive analyses by lawyers, agency regulators, and judges. There is no
conventional usage or ordinary understanding that explains why a supervisor
questioning an employee about her union sympathies has not "interfered" 28
with the employee's right to organize, or why a manager convening a
mandatory meeting during work hours to predict-or even misrepresent-the
risks associated with unions has not "restrained" or "coerced" 29 employees in
their exercise of that right. The statutory prohibitions on employer conduct
have accrued content through decades of lawyer-directed practical applications.
These applications include advising management ex ante on how to encourage
workers to reject a union without committing unlawful interference or coercion,
and advocating to agencies and courts ex post on whether what workers
experienced amounted to coercion or restraint, or instead was simply a form of
vigorous employer speech protected under the NLRA and arguably sheltered by
the First Amendment. 3 0
Stepping back, citizens and businesses do not generally expect to review
statutory language in order to understand their rights and responsibilities under
the law. In our modem regulatory state, individuals and corporations consult
lawyers to help them derive meaning from statutory text. Even for criminal
31
statutes, something of a special case, criminal lawyers effectively serve as
translators ex ante and as monitors ex post. An individual who pays off a large
gambling debt by purchasing cashiers' checks from a series of banks does not
himself consult the federal criminal code to determine if he has "willfully
violat[ed]" the anti-structuring provisions of federal money-laundering law; he
32
asks a lawyer for expert advice.
54 (1995); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057,
1057-58(1995).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
28. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 171-73 (John E. Higgins Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006)
(discussing NLRB's totality-of-the-circumstances approach when reviewing employer
interrogation of individual employees).
29. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B 400, 405-06 (1953) (allowing employer
captive audience speeches); see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 315 U.S. 595, 618 (1969)
(allowing employer predictions but not threats); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127,
133 (1982) (allowing employer misrepresentations).
30. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945) (discussing difference between
employer persuasion and coercion as First Amendment matter); 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006)
(identifying difference as statutory matter).
31. The severity of punishment attached to criminal statutes leaves citizens more
vulnerable if the prohibitions of the law are not adequately clear and understandable. See
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 148-50 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
32. See generally Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
1204 [Vol. 98:1199
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As Professors Stephen Ross and Edward Rubin have observed, most
federal statutes are not designed to be read by citizens at large, but rather by a
small community of lawyers, regulators, and individuals or firms subject to
rules drafted by lawyers.33 This narrower group of specialists develops the
meaning of statutory prohibitions, directives, or entitlements in light of the
evolving circumstances and extrinsic public-law values that Professor Frickey
has referenced.34 Frickey advises that language canon proponents should be
wary of simplification: the legal interpretive community's attribution of
meaning to a statute is both "complex and normatively driven." 35 It is therefore
neither candid nor constructive to assert that legal interpretation relies in any
conclusive or mechanical way on notions of conventional usage or ordinary
meaning.36 Given that such notions have little impact in constraining judges'
ability to make pragmatic or normative choices, it also is not overly persuasive
to maintain that reliance on language canons enhances predictability or judicial
objectivity. 37 My coauthored empirical study of Supreme Court decisions
invoking language canons over a thirty-five-year period supports Frickey's
skepticism on these points.38
2. Substantive Canons and Neutrality
Substantive canons are grounded not in judgments about the conventional
understanding of language, but in an array of judicially generated policy
concerns. Among more than one hundred such canons set forth in the latest
edition of the Casebook are norms or presumptions regarding how statutory
text should be harmonized with judicially identified constitutional priorities,39
judicially perceived statutory objectives, 40 or pre-enactment common law
practices. 41 Like their linguistic cousins, substantive canons are justified
33. See Ross, supra note 26, at 1057; Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381, 383 (1989).
34. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1085; text accompanying supra
notes 24-25.
35. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1094.
36. See id; RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 193 (2008).
37. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 469,473-74 (1996).
38. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 93-102 (2005).
39. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, app. B at 29-33 (discussing inter alia the presumption
against federal preemption of traditional state regulation, the presumption against interpretations
that would jeopardize a statute's constitutionality, and the rule of lenity).
40, See id. at 36-41 (discussing inter alia the presumption against repeals by implication,
the strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals, and the presumption that each side bears its
own costs in adjudications).
41. See id. at 34-35 (discussing inter alia the presumption against extraterritorial
application of U.S. law, the rule against implied waivers of U.S. sovereign immunity, and the
presumption favoring common law usage where Congress employs words or concepts with well-
settled common law traditions).
2010] 1205
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primarily by reference to imputed congressional understanding. For instance,
when the text is inconclusive, Congress is viewed as preferring that meaning
"most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision
must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume
Congress always has in mind."42 Thus, the Supreme Court assumes that
Congress generally prefers exemptions to the Internal Revenue Code to be
narrowly construed, 4 3 believes labor-management arbitration agreements
should be enforced," and wants states' core sovereign authority preserved
unless it imposes limits on such authority in unmistakably clear textual terms. 4 5
Professor Frickey unmasks this seemingly benign fiction. He identifies
two principal ways-the creation of new canons, and drift in the meaning of the
canons-by which the Court's use of substantive canons undermines claims of
neutrality as well as predictability.
With respect to the Court's tendency to create new substantive canons, a
judicially expressed policy preference should not in theory become a canon
until it is firmly rooted and widely recognized.4 6 Yet the sheer volume of
substantive canons relied on by the Court in recent times raises questions as to
whether they are stable, judicially entrenched norms. The Casebook lists 105
substantive policy canons invoked by the Rehnquist Court from 1986 to 2006,
compared with 28 language canons invoked during the same period.47
Moreover, as Frickey observes, the Court may announce a new policy
presumption and shortly thereafter reference this presumption as an established
48
substantive canon based simply on its prior decision.
Many of the substantive canons invoked since the mid-1980s narrow the
scope or impact of text enacted by Congress, assigning broader authority and
42. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
43. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354, 356 (1988).
44. See Nolde Bros. v. Local 358 Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 254-55 (1977).
45. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-67 (1991) (holding that Congress
failed to subject appointed state judges to mandatory retirement under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-68 (1989) (holding that
Congress failed to subject states to liability as "persons" under section 1983 of the 1871 Civil
Rights Act).
46. See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONs 211 (1999);
Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 92-94 (2009).
47. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, app. B at 19-23 (listing language canons with case
citations); id. at 29-41 (listing substantive canons with case citations). In addition to these 105
separate substantive canons, the Casebook lists 21 more Rehnquist Court policy canons derived
from statutory sources: 12 related to considerations of statutory continuity and 9 referring to
extrinsic legislative sources, principally legislative history. See id. at 25-28.
48. See Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1990-91 (describing the
Court's two-step creation of a canon that "a party contending that legislative action changed
settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change," quoting Green
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989)). See also CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1213
(suggesting that Court is in process of canonizing a presumption against reading statutory
delegations broadly, based on decisions in 1994 and 2000).
1206 [Vol. 98:1199
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discretion to the states, 49 the executive branch,50 and the laws of other nations.
The Court has been especially forceful in announcing new presumptions and
clear statement rules that elevate and enforce federalism values.52 As Frickey
points out, the Court's canonical preferences for state sovereignty over national
regulation, and also for private ordering over government regulation, are hardly
policy-neutral; rather, they qualify as troubling forms of countermajoritarian
judicial activism. 53
In addition to this normative concern, the Court's proliferation of
substantive canons affects the orderly and integrated elaboration of statutory
law. Canonizing various policy preferences obviates the need to develop and
defend judicial reasoning through detailed analysis of textual meaning,
legislative purpose, or prior precedent. Frickey's description of the substantive
canons as "techniques of judicial evasion" 54 reflects this state of affairs. Even
assuming, arguendo, that Congress generally wants tax exemptions to be
narrowly construed or states' core sovereign functions to be preserved, the
Justices' reliance on such presumptions allows them to minimize in-depth
inquiry as to what Congress actually meant to accomplish through a particular
exemption or a specific limitation on states' authority.
A further consequence of proliferating substantive canons that relates to
orderly elaboration of the law is the Court's decreased willingness to address
the challenges posed by updated statutory text and unforeseen factual
circumstances. Congress typically revisits and modifies its major regulatory
schemes over several decades. In doing so, it adjusts various protections and
prohibitions in light of intervening agency or court decisions, the advent of new
56
statutes in related areas, and changed social or economic conditions. Yet by
49. See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn. 534 U.S. 533, 543-44 (2002); BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 543-45 (1994); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64
(1991).
50. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190-92 (1993); Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 642-44 (1992).
51. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454-56 (2007); F. Hoffman-
LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
52. See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct
Democracy, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 105, 128-31 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey,
Interpretation on the Borderline]; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 619-28.
53. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 640-44.
54. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1988.
55. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1231, 1295-98 (2009) (discussing Court's use of tax-based substantive canons to frame and
simplify judicial analysis).
56. Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in 1972, 1978, and 1991, and
it has modified the 1933 and 1934 securities laws on several recent occasions as well. See
generally Michael A. Perrino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998) (discussing 1995 Private Securities Litigation
2010] 1207
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invoking policy presumptions as a way of framing and simplifying their
analyses at a given statutory moment, the Justices make it less likely that such
subsequent legal or factual developments will be thoroughly considered.57
As Frickey recognizes, one possible justification for the substantive
canons' lack of interpretive neutrality and their evasive tendencies is that the
Court's injection of its own policy norms helps make statutory interpretation
more predictable.58 If the substantive canons are regularly invoked and
consistently applied, then the Court's methodology should be transparent
enough so that legislators, lower courts, and lawyers can conduct their own
business "with a reasonable degree of certainty about [the] likely judicial
reception down the road."59 But, this is where Frickey's second concern comes
into play: even established substantive canons undergo subtle drifts or sudden
shifts in meaning over time.60
In terms of drift, the Court since the late 1980s has often declared that
Congress must be reasonably clear when it seeks to define criminal activity,6 1
to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction,62 or to interfere with traditional or
historical state functions.63 The Court's declarations, however, have not
resulted in clarity or predictability from one decision to the next. The rule of
lenity, prescribing that ambiguity in a penal statute should be resolved in favor
of the defendant, may serve as a front-end presumption effectively shaping the
interpretive process, or merely as a tiebreaker at the back end of that process.
Reform Act); David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Umiform
Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1 (1998).
Amendments to the Internal Revenue code are even more frequent. See RICHARD GERSHON, A
STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 1.02 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing
Congress's regular amendments to the 1986 code, including "fairly major changes" in 1991, 1993,
and 1996).
57. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 477-78 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in
part) (criticizing majority's use of super strong clear statement rule protecting state's sovereign
authority as a way to limit the development of Court's constitutional precedent in this area);
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260-66, 278 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority's use of presumption against extraterritoriality as a barrier to considering
legislative history sources that indicate how Congress meant to protect employee interests).
58. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 66-67.
59. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1981.
60. See id. at 1983-84, 1989-90; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 635-36.
61. See, e.g., Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-06 (2005);
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24-25 (2000); United States v. Kominski, 487 U.S. 931,
949-52 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454-56 (2007); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428,440-41 (1989).
63. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Hawaiian
Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01
(1989).
64. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (Breyer, J.) (using the
rule of lenity as a tiebreaker); id. at 148-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding it is a front-end
presumption); Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1990. This divergence in
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Similarly, the rule disfavoring extraterritorial jurisdiction may operate as a
presumption that can be overcome by the cogent force of legislative history and
other contextual evidence of congressional will, or as a virtually irrebuttable
clear statement rule.65 And the Court's admonition against federal preemption
of traditional state regulation is distinguished just as often as it is followed.66
The proposition that Congress places a high priority on the goal of
achieving clarity in statutory text is at a minimum contestable.67 But even if
Congress regards such clarity as desirable, the Court's divergent
understandings as to how its policy presumptions should be weighted, and its
inconsistent application of these presumptions, belie the notion that substantive
canons can effectively channel the congressional drafting enterprise. 6 8
While canon drift poses a threat to predictability, more dramatic shifts in
canon meaning give rise to additional concerns about neutrality. When the
Court suddenly elevates a weak canon into a clear statement rule, it effectively
penalizes Congress for having failed to foresee years earlier how the Court's
preferences were likely to change.69 This "bait-and-switch" tactic enables the
Court to disrespect Congress's prior policy judgments without acknowledging
that it is doing so.70 Frickey points out how this has occurred with regard to
Congress's approach to abrogating states' immunity to suit in federal court.n
The Court has imposed clear statement rules on text enacted in a very different
era of judicial expectations to frustrate other congressional policy preferences
as well.72
views may be expressed within the opinions of a single Justice. Compare Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125, 148-50 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), with United States v. Hayes, 129
S.Ct. 1079, 1088-89 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., majority).
65. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260-66, 278 (1991) (Rehnquist, J.,
majority, concluding it is a clear statement rule); id. at 260-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(concluding it is a presumption).
66. See, e.g., Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical
Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1604, 1612-13 (2007) (reporting that from 1983 to 2004, the "Court decided 127 cases involving
federal preemption of state law": state law held not preempted 59 times, fully preempted 59 times,
and partly preempted 9 times); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 106 & nn.438-39 (listing
ERISA decisions between 1989 and 2002 in which anti-preemption rule was relied on and others
in which it was distinguished or disregarded).
67. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics ofLegislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600-05, 614-16 (2002); Stephen Breyer, On
the Uses ofLegislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 870-71 (1992);
see also Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories
of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 957, 967-73 (2007) (contending that
statutory text is a form of compressed policy instruction and legislative history enables courts to
expand that instruction based on the meanings contemplated by those who transmitted the
instructions).
68. See Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1990.
69. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 106-07.
70. See Frickey, supra note 37, at 474 n.29; CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 939-41.
71. See Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1983-84.
72. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (thwarting Congress's 1974
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Moreover, although the Rehnquist Court's canonically-induced shifts
were not explained or justified as constitutional pronouncements, they turn out
to be comparably difficult to revisit by means of congressional override.
Frickey observes that such overrides would presumptively be sought to
vindicate Congress's civil rights or worker protection preferences in an era of
divided government. To overcome a conservative President on these matters,
Congress would need the same two-thirds supermajorities in each house as is
required for a constitutional amendment.74 Further, the enactability of a
congressional override preference also depends on the legislative vehicle in
which it would likely be packaged.7 5 For instance, statutes enacted in the 1970s
extending states' liability to their employees were not controversial when
integrated as part of legislative packages aimed at combating workplace
76 'teplcdiscrimination in general. But if the policy package presented to Congress
were to focus primarily-if not exclusively-on exposing states to monetary
liability, especially during austere economic times, then congressional approval
would become far more of a challenge.
B. Frickey's Limited Defense of the Canons on Institutional Grounds
Although Frickey devotes considerable analytic attention to unmasking
certain claims advanced by canon proponents, he is not prepared to dismiss the
canons as an interpretive resource. Rather, he regards them as performing
useful, albeit circumscribed, functions in a Court-created interpretive regime.
Frickey's defense addresses the language canons' role in encouraging more
efficient statutory drafting and the substantive canons' role in signaling the
intensity of judicial policy preferences.77 In each instance, Frickey attempts to
defend the canons' value by invoking the Court's institutional role relative to
Congress.
determination to regulate states' sovereign authority); see also Solid Waste Agency v. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (thwarting Congress's determination to regulate
certain intrastate activities). See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress,
100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001).
73. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 635-39 (discussing four cases, decided
during Republican presidencies, construing Fair Labor Standards Act, Civil Rights Act, and
Education of the Handicapped Act).
74. See id. at 639.
75. See Elizabeth Garrett, Preferences, Laws, and Default Rules, 122 HARv. L. REV. 2104,
2132 (2009) (book review).
76. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86
Stat. 103, 103 (1972) (conference report approved 62 to 10 in Senate, and 303 to 110 in House,
118 Cong. Rec. 7170, 7572-73 (1972)); Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74 (1974) (conference report approved 345 to 50 in House, and 71 to 19
in Senate, 120 Cong. Rec. 8605, 8769 (1974)); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101, 104 Stat. 327, 330 (1990) (conference report approved 377 to 28 in
House, and 91 to 6 in Senate, 136 Cong. Rec. 17296-97, 17376 (1990)).
77. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 65-71.
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1. Encouraging Efficient Legislative Drafting
In his coauthored Supreme Court Foreword, Frickey suggests that
language canons can lower the cost of drafting statutes by establishing what are
in effect rules of the road.78 Thus, for instance, if the Court regularly applies the
expressio unius canon, legislative drafters will come to understand ex ante that
when inserting a list of protected or prohibited activities they should either
make the list exhaustive or add language specifying that the list is purely
illustrative. 79 Even if the expressio unius canon relies on an unrealistic vision of
past legislators as omniscient drafters, a consistent judicial respect for this
canon will encourage current and future legislators to be more careful when
including lists in their statutory drafts.80
However, Frickey subsequently expresses two important reservations as to
whether the canons really can make drafting more efficient. First, members of
Congress generally do not care all that much about rules of the road. Successful
legislative drafting typically requires collective action through negotiated
agreement among three institutional players-the House, the Senate, and the
President.8 1 It is a "competitive process of coalition-building, bargaining, and
voting" that includes the resolution of intense conflicts of policy interests and
priorities.82 In this highly pressurized consensus-driven setting, legislators and
their staffs do not tend to rely on or seriously consider generalized rules of
construction. 83 Accordingly, when members draft a list of occupations
exempted from statutory immigration controls, 84 or of supervisory powers that
preclude being protected under national labor laws, these lists are more likely
to reflect a series of negotiations among sponsors and supporters, and less
likely to involve close attention to judicial guidelines of clear drafting.86
78. See id at 67.
79. See id
80. See id But cf Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) (arguing that lack of omniscience cannot be
addressed, much less cured, through greater attention to rules of drafting, because the core reason
behind this lack of omniscience is that text "necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with
imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application").
81. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 5, at 1744-46.
82. Id at 1745.
83. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 600-05, 614-16.
84. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59, 462-65 (1892)
(analyzing language and purpose of 1885 Immigration Act).
85. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 578-79, 587-88 (1994)
(presenting conflicting interpretations of language and purpose of 1947 amendment to National
Labor Relations Act).
86. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 614-16; William W. Buzbee, The One-
Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 179, 190-92 (2000).
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Second, courts often disagree about how the rules of the road operate.
This disagreement is not surprising given that Congress's regulatory schemes
typically involve the accretion of successive enactments addressing new and
overlapping issues over multiple decades.88 Such lawmaking developments
tend to produce linguistic complexities that undermine canonical aspirations to
avoid surplus phrases or maintain textual integrity. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that thoughtful Justices frequently differ as to which interpretation
truly promotes broader structural coherence, 89 or best comports with inferences
concerning particularized word choice or sentence structure. 90 Even if Congress
were to pay closer attention to language canons when drafting, legislators
would be hard-pressed to find consistent guidance or encouragement from
judicial applications of these canons.
Assuming the language canons cannot systemically encourage Congress
to draft more efficiently, they may still assist courts in situational terms by
deepening the interpretive inquiry. What Frickey calls "[p]erhaps the least
ambitious defense" involves viewing these canons as a checklist of things for
courts to consider, a "catalogue of contextual factors." 91 As rules of thumb,
they are subject to being questioned, challenged, or distinguished in light of
other interpretive factors. 9 2 The use of language canons to recognize and
respond to arguments raised by lower courts, dissenting Justices, or non-
prevailing parties effectively invites courts to consider additional sources of
legislative meaning, which in turn enhances the shape and coherence of
majority opinions. In short, language canons may contribute to the Court's
87. See Frickey, Revisiting the Revival, supra note 4, at 207-12 (doubting that canonical
formalism has increased predictability, as illustrated by the split between majority and dissent in
BFP v Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), involving whether a canon was sufficiently
"established" to justify departure from the ordinary meaning of text).
88. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 103-05.
89. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594-97, 603-04 (2004)
(Souter & Thomas, JJ., disagree about application of whole act rule); Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U.S. 84, 89, 97-98 (2001) (Breyer & O'Connor, JJ., disagree about whether to ignore
or apply canon against surplusage); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 836-37,
842-43 (1988) (White & Kennedy, JJ., disagree about which interpretation truly furthers whole
act rule); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 163-64, 173-74, 177-78 (1981) (Stewart &
Brennan, JJ., disagree about which interpretation is consistent with in pari materia canon).
90. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583-84, 593-94 (2000) (majority
and dissent debate applicability of expressio unius to a provision of Fair Labor Standards Act);
John Hancock Life Ins. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96-97, 112-12 (1993) (majority
and dissent disagree on applicability of expressio unius to text of ERISA); Breininger v. Sheet
Metal Workers, 493 U.S. 67, 91-92, 97-98 (1989) (majority and dissent disagree on applicability
of ejusdem generis).
91. CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 947.
92. See, e.g., West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217-22, 225 (1999) (rejecting language canon
argument and relying on legislative history, purpose, and inaction); Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,
511 (1996) (using language canon to raise a question about congressional intent); Bufferd v.
Comm'r, 506 U.S. 523, 529-30 (1993) (deflecting language canon argument as unpersuasive and
relying instead on legislative history and agency interpretation to support its view of text).
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case-by-case reputation for rational or principled decision making, but they do
not materially enhance drafting efficiency, and their value in this regard should
not be overstated.
2. Signaling the Intensity of the Court's Policy Preferences
Also in the Supreme Court Foreword, Frickey maintains that the
substantive canons should be viewed as potent signaling devices. 9 3 Under this
theory, the Court has applied numerous strong presumptions and clear state-
ment rules to confine statutory meaning because the Court is uncomfortable
with certain policy judgments reached by Congress, 94 or relatedly because the
Court seeks to protect what it views as underenforced constitutional nonrs.95
Frickey presents three areas in which the Court's effort to vindicate preferred
values or norms is well developed: the Rehnquist Court's use of the rule of
lenity, the longstanding canons resolving ambiguities in favor of Indians, and
the Warren Court's reliance on the constitutional avoidance canon.
First, the conservative law-and-order Rehnquist Court invoked the rule of
lenity in a series of decisions to help justify its reversal of criminal
convictions.96 The Justices acted in this way partly to vindicate traditional due
process values reflected in the concept of lenity. 97 More important in Frickey's
view, however, is that Congress's persistent efforts to nationalize crime
conflicted with the Court's strong commitment to respect the values of
federalism and to minimize new burdens on the lower courts' docket.98
Second, in the field of federal Indian law, the Court has longstanding
canons requiring that ambiguities in treaties and statutes be resolved in favor of
the Indians.99 An expert in Indian law, Frickey has written extensively about
the Court's uses of these canons to protect the interests, property rights, and
sovereignty of Indian tribes unless Congress has clearly expressed a contrary
intent. 1 The canons are "rooted in the unique trust relationship" that has long
93. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 68-70.
94. See id at 69-70.
95. See Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline, supra note 52, at 128.
96. See id. (discussing Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) and Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)). For additional examples, see Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S.
12 (2000); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137
(1995); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
97. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 70 (discussing Court's concerns about strict
liability for crimes that are not malum in se).
98. Seeid.at70-71.
99. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200
(1999); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976); Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
100. See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 119-22
(3d ed. 2005) (Frickey authored the handbook's discussion of the canons, see Email from Ethan H.
Shaw, LexisNexis, to Melanie Oberlin, Moritz College of Law (May 26, 2009) (on file with
author)); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 440 & n.249 (1993) [hereinafter
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existed between the United States and the Indians.' 0 Frickey views the trust
relationship as based primarily on structures of sovereignty within our system
of government rather than on judicial solicitude for Indians as powerless
minorities. 102 Like the federalism values underlying the Court's recent rule-of-
lenity jurisprudence, the Indian law canons have a quasi-constitutional status-
they furnish an interpretive framework that presumptively privileges sovereign
interests distinct from those asserted by Congress through federal statutes. 10 3
Finally, Frickey has examined the Warren Court's use of the
constitutional avoidance canon to address the rights of individual dissenters in a
national security setting.' 04 In a series of cases decided during the 1950s, the
Court narrowed the scope of laws and other directives that sought to remove
"disloyal" or "subversive" individuals from federal employment105 or to punish
them for refusing to answer questions posed by the federal government.06 The
Court's interpretations repeatedly ignored Congress's evident disciplinary
intent. In Frickey's view, the explanation for these decisions was the Justices'
interest in protecting the underenforced constitutional norms of free expression
and privacy during a period when explicit constitutional lawmaking to protect
those norms would likely have failed and have provoked strong public
hostility.107 The Warren Court applied this canonical approach even when the
statute under review was not ambiguous-all the Justices in the majority
required was that Congress had not actively considered or explicitly taken
responsibility for the serious consequences to individual rights that could
follow from the text it approved.' 08 Frickey's analysis suggests that the Warren
Court of the 1950s and the Rehnquist Court of the 1990s may have shared a
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present].
101. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
102. See COHEN, supra note 100, at 122-23; Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 431, 439-40, 477-81 (2005)
[hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism]; Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present,
supra note 100, at 425-26.
103. See COHEN, supra note 100, at 126-127; Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our
Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109
YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1999). The presumptive privileging of Indian sovereign interests has been
curtailed by Court decisions in recent decades, as Frickey has trenchantly observed. See id at 58-
73; Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 102, at 452-72.
104. See Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5.
105. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 337-48 (1955) (narrowly construing Civil
Service Commission Loyalty Review Board's jurisdiction in case of alleged disloyalty by
petitioner); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956) (narrowly construing federal statute); Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 122-25 (1956) (narrowly construing
operation of federal statute in case of alleged subversive design by petitioner).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (narrowly construing House
resolution); United States v. Witkovitch, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) (narrowly construing federal
statute); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (narrowly construing House resolution);
Yates v. United States, 345 U.S. 298 (1957) (narrowly construing federal statute).
107. See Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5, at 450-58.
108. Seeid at459-61.
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willingness to elevate certain policy preferences in the face of clear, though not
unequivocally explicit, evidence that Congress intended a contrary outcome.
One could seek to justify these three instances of substantive canon-
signaling in terms of the Court's effort to protect the politically powerless, as
Professor Elhauge does in his recent book on statutory interpretation. 09
Frickey, however, is more inclined to view the Court's signaling forays as
efforts to protect substantive values, not individuals or groups. At the same
time, Frickey is uncomfortable at the prospect that the Court's policy
judgments in some areas may disrespect the will of Congress, 110 a concern that
applies regardless of whether the Court believes it is vindicating powerless
groups or underenforced norms.
Perhaps more important, Frickey recognizes that it is not easy to know
just what are underenforced norms or powerless groups."' The Rehnquist
Court regarded federalism values as constitutionally underenforced, notwith-
standing the Court's quite recent and high profile constitutional rejection of a
judicially enforced federalism approach.1 12 Further, although the Court's
canon-inspired protections for criminal defendants may be easily overridden
because of that group's politically impotent status,113 state governments are
more formidable in protecting and advancing their own policy priorities."14
In sum, Frickey understands and appreciates that the Court's use of
substantive canons to promote its own preferred outcomes may be difficult to
confine. That we would applaud some institutionally based canon preferences
and condemn others is not per se troubling-we presumably would have the
same range of reactions to policy preferences and understandings expressed by
Congress or the executive. But, once we view the canons as an institutional
resource effectively promoting the Court's policy preferences, certain first-
order questions arise, as explained in Part II.
109. See ELHAUGE, supra note 12, at 168-81, 186-87.
110. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 71 (expressing discomfort with Court's use
of Lenity); Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5, at 446 (acknowledging the Warren
Court's "aggressive rewriting of statutes" through the avoidance canon).
111. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 597, 611-12 (describing Court's dramatic
shift from 1970s to 1980s regarding which constitutionally based canons warranted aggressive
enforcement).
112. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 50, at 637 (noting how Court has used federalism canon to circumvent
Garcia).
113. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding the Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 344-45 (1991); see also Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum,
Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT
THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE l990s 224, 240-42 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel
C. Patterson eds., 1998) (finding overrides more than twice as likely when United States was a
party on losing side).
114. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1520-59
(1994); see also Eskridge, supra note 113, at 351-52 (observing that states are unusually
successful at obtaining congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions).
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II
THE CANONS AS SUBORDINATE TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND AGENCY
DIRECTIVES
A. Comparing Branch-Specific Interpretive Assets
Although federal courts are ultimately responsible for addressing
controversies about the meaning of statutory language, courts regularly rely on
contextual resources from all three branches when resolving disputes. Since the
1980s, judges and scholars have increasingly debated the comparative merits of
branch-specific interpretive assets, especially the merits of canons and
legislative history." 5 Normative debates revolve primarily around issues of
legitimacy and reliability. In terms of legitimacy, Justice Scalia and other
textualists have contended that legislative history is suspect in constitutional
termsll6 and have implied that canons-as freestanding policy or language
maxims steeped in custom or practice-have a law-like respectability that is
missing from legislative record documents opportunistically created in a
partisan and politicized environment. In terms of reliability, legal process
scholars have trumpeted the canons' value as gap-filling principles that enhance
the clarity and predictability of enacted text;" 8 again, this contrasts with
politically-tinged, messy legislative history, deemed by textualists to be
susceptible to judicial manipulation.1 9
Professor Frickey's contributions with respect to the canons have
generated a rich collection of descriptive and normative insights. Many of these
insights address the canons' role in promoting values and policies favored by
the judicial branch. My intention is to broaden and deepen Frickey's
institutional focus, by exploring how the canons measure up as an institutional
resource when compared with legislative history and agency guidance--core
interpretive resources generated by the two other branches. In moving beyond
critical analysis of the canons as a self-contained interpretive asset, I suggest
115. Compare, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 6, at 25-37, with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-102 (2005) (disagreement among
Supreme Court Justices); Shapiro, supra note 6, at 943-45, with RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276-83 (1985) (disagreement about merits of the canons);
Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 441, 447
(1990), with Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role ofLegislative
Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437-42 (2005) (disagreement about merits of
legislative history).
116. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 6, at 31; Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative
History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998); Kenneth W. Starr,
Observations About the Use ofLegislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375-76 (1987).
117. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994); John F. Manning, Legal Realism and
the Canons'Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 284-85, 290-95 (2002).
118. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 147-57; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 67.
119. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 115, at 447; Kozinski, supra note 116, at 813.
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why, in systemic terms, the canons should be ranked distinctly below the
political branch interpretive assets.
To be clear, I believe that the contextual resources of all three branches
play situationally important roles in helping courts resolve particular disputes,
and that they should continue to do so. Moreover, I have recently written about
the need to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach when assessing the virtues and
vices of legislative history or the canons. 120 Nonetheless, I maintain that from
the standpoint of legitimacy, canons should be regarded as institutionally
suspect when compared with legislative history; and, from the standpoint of
objective reliability, as inferior to both legislative history and agency guidance.
These arguments support the need to shift interpretive emphasis away from
textualist and canon-centered approaches, where it has often been since the late
1980s, and towards more purposive and pragmatic approaches that favor
interpretive resources generated by Congress and the executive.
B. Legitimacy
Statutory interpretation is predicated on respect for the lawmaking
supremacy of Congress and for text as the final product of a representative and
deliberative democratic process. This democratic deliberation results in a
considerable amount of vagueness in enacted language. Although Congress
could perhaps do a better job of removing unnecessary vagueness,121 the
persistence of inconclusive language is both inevitable and valuable.122 It is
impossible to explore all policy implications accompanying different ways to
draft a complex regulatory scheme.' 2 3 Further, to avoid procedural roadblocks
and secure compromise, language must be drafted or modified so as to achieve
support even at some cost in clarity.124
Where the Constitution suggests courts might look for interpretive
assistance, the canons are not referenced at all. This is unsurprising given
Article III's silence on techniques or methods of judicial review. 12 At the same
120. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55 (discussing how Court's use of legislative
history and canons varies from one subject matter area to another); James J. Brudney, The
Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg's Eclectic Approach to Statutory
Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889 (2009) (contending that one Justice's varying reliance on
canons and legislative history is shaped by pragmatic interest in fostering institutional dialogue).
121. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2143-57 (proposing that Congress codify rules of statutory interpretation).
122. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A. C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value ofAmbiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REv. 627,
630, 640-42 (2002); see also James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial
Interpretation ofStatutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-40 (1994).
123. See HENRYS. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY 116-18 (2002).
124. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 594-97, 615-16; see also Brudney, supra
note 122, at 29-32.
125. Article 3, Section I authorizes a system of federal courts and sets a compensation
standard for federal judges; Section 2 specifies federal jurisdiction; Section 3 addresses treason.
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time, the Constitution plants the seeds for what we now think of as legislative
history by empowering Congress to "determine the Rules of its
Proceedings," 26 and by requiring each House to "keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same."' 27 The Journal Clause's
origins and historical context indicate the Framers believed it was important to
have a publicly accessible record of how and why Congress reached the
decisions it did, and that such a record was essential to promote broader
understanding of legislative action.
1. The Record ofFloor Debates
Discussions of the Journal Clause at the Convention and during
Ratification by the states indicate broad support for publication-not simply
because of how members voted but also because of positions taken during the
proceedings.128 The text of Article I, Section 5 confirms this: it requires each
House to record voting by members and to keep a record of overall
proceedings.129
The Constitution's insistence on publication and against secrecy was a
relatively new legislative design feature in the Anglo-American setting. The
British Parliament had long operated in secrecy, punishing those persons who
sought to publish records of its proceedings.13 0 The Continental Congress
The only mention of how courts are to function is the requirement for a jury trial in federal
criminal cases. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
126. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
127. Id. cl. 3.
128. See, e.g., 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 290-91 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987) (remarks of James Wilson at Federal, Sept. Convention 14, 1787); id. at 292-
93 (remarks of George Mason at Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 14-15, 1788); id. at 294
(debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 26, 1788). The debates reveal a strong
commitment to publishing the journals of Senate and House proceedings-debates focused on
how the Constitution should clarify exceptions for highly sensitive military and diplomatic
transactions. See DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
26-28, 35-37 (1981). See generally JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§ 838 (1833) ("The object of the whole clause [1.5.3] is to ensure publicity of the proceedings to
the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their respective
constituents.").
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see also STORY, supra note 128, at § 839.
So long as known and open responsibility is valuable as a check, or an incentive among
the representatives of a free people, so long a journal of their proceedings, and their
votes, published in the face of the world, will continue to enjoy public favour, and be
demanded by public opinion.
Id. (emphasis added).
130. See G. H. JENNINGS, AN ANECDOTAL HISTORY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIODS 559 (Horace Cox 4th ed. 1899). By the mid-eighteenth century, early
reporting on parliamentary debates included some outright fabrication of members' speeches by
persons who had not been present at the debates. See id. at 561; see also Parliament Home Page -
Hansard (official report), http://www.parliament.uk/about/livingheritage/evolutionofparliament/
communicating/keydates/publicationofofficialreport.cfn (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter
History of Hansard] (stating that suppression of unofficial printings of debates did not cease until
[Vol. 98:11991218
HeinOnline  -- 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1218 2010
POLITICAL BRANCH INTERPRETIVE ASSETS
swore its members to secrecy and initially refused to publish any of its
proceedings,'3 1 while the Constitutional Convention excluded outsiders during
its entire deliberative process.1 32 To be sure, contrary design approaches were
emerging-the British Parliament allowed for reporting of proceedings in the
reign of George 111,133 and the Articles of Confederation and some early state
legislatures provided for journals of their proceedings.1 34 Still, the requirement
of published legislative proceedings was an innovation, based on a belief that
transparency in the deliberative process would promote responsibility of
members to their constituents and that "[t]he public mind [would be]
enlightened by an attentive examination of. . .public measures."
1 35
Although the House and Senate Journals are summaries of the floor
proceedings that do not record debates and discussions,' 36 members of
Congress understood from the beginning that the commitment to publication
encompassed reporting on the debates as well.13 1 In April 1792, Rep. Elbridge
Gerry offered the first proposal for the House to appoint official stenographers
who would transcribe and publish the debates. 138 Importantly, Gerry contended
1771). See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 411 (2004).
131. See HOFFMAN, supra note 128, at 14; EDMUND CODY BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 67 (Norton 1964) (1941); Vermeule, supra note 130; see also Senate Historical Office,
Reporters of Debate and the Congressional Record, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/ReportersDebateCongressionalRecord.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010)
(describing Continental Congress having closed its doors to the public and the press).
132. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF I787 xi-xxv (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966); BURNETT, supra note 131, at 691-92.
133. See HOFFMAN, supra note 128, at 13; History of Hansard, supra note 130 (suppression
of printed debates ends in 1771); HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, FACTSHEET G3 GENERAL
SERIES: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 8 (Apr. 2009) available at
http://www.parliament.uk/docunents/upload/GO3.pdf (newspaper reporters are first allocated
seats in public gallery in 1803).
134. See HOFFMAN, supra note 128, at 13-14; 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 128, at 289 (quoting Articles of Confederation, calling for monthly publication of journals
with exception for parts requiring secrecy because "relating to treaties, alliances or military
operations"); id. at 301 (quoting James Wilson's Lectures on Law in 1791, referring to
Constitution of Pennsylvania that required journals to be published weekly).
135. STORY, supra note 128, § 838, quoted in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892).
136. See ROBERT C. BYRD, 2 THE SENATE 311-12 (1991); MILDRED AMER,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD; CONTENT, HISTORY AND
ISSUES 1 (Jan. 14, 1993).
137. See Elizabeth Gregory McPherson, Reporting the Debates of Congress, Q. J. SPEECH,
Apr. 1942, 141, reprinted in 88 CONG. REC. A2182 (1942) (extension of remarks of Rep. Mundt,
June 10, 1942); see also AMER, supra note 136, at 2-3.
138. See McPherson, supra note 137, at 142-43; SAMUEL OPPENHEIM, THE EARLY
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES AND REPORTERS 10-11 (1889) (Paper read at Fourteenth Annual
Meeting of N.Y. State Stenographers Assn). Rep. Gerry had been a delegate to the Continental
Congress and the Constitutional Convention, and one of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence and the Articles of Confederation. Subsequently, he served as Governor of
Massachusetts and as Vice President under President Madison. See GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS,
ELBRIDGE GERRY: FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN 68-81, 89, 153-206, 308-
29 (1976).
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that in addition to informing citizens about the reasons or motives underlying
the conduct of their representatives, impartial publication of floor debates was
desirable to "aid the Executive in administering the Government [and] the
Judiciary in expounding the laws." 3 9
Congressional debates were initially published not through official
reporters but by commercial journalists, who were admitted to the chamber
(along with the public at large) to sit in galleries or on the legislative floor.
Their reports were later distributed through newspaper publication by use of the
franking privilege.14 0 The House began admitting journalists starting in 1789,
and by 1795 both chambers allowed for published proceedings-albeit fitfully
due to economic considerations and periodic pique with the accuracy or
honesty of particular journalists.14 1
2. The Record ofStanding Committees
Alongside the Journal Clause, the Constitution authorizes each chamber of
Congress to create rules that will determine the structure of its internal
proceedings.142 Initially, both the House and Senate appointed scores of select
committees to serve during each session of Congress, directing them to draft
particular texts or to address specific policy problems.' 4 3 Under this improvised
approach, select committees were responsive to the chamber as a whole, which
used them essentially as technical aids.
139. OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at 10. The Gerry Resolution was referred to a committee
but no action was taken on the committee report. Id. at 12.
140. See HOFFMAN, supra note 128, at 49-50; McPherson, supra note 137, at 142-43; see
also RICHARD J. MCKINNEY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD AND ITS
PREDECESSOR PUBLICATIONS 1 (Apr. 2005) available at http://www.1lsde.orglattachments/
wysiwyg/544/cong-record.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) ("There was no precedent in colonial or
English legislative practice for more then [sic] just the keeping of official journals, but from early
on unofficial commercial reporters were allowed access to the House and Senate chambers."). The
franking privilege, created by Congress, allows certain materials to be sent through the U.S. mail
without postage. See MATTHEW ERIC GLASSMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
FRANKING PRIVILEGE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (Dec. 5, 2007)
(describing how Congress from 1789 onward has authorized its members and officials to transmit
postage-free mail conveying information about congressional business).
141. See McPherson, supra note 137, at 142-43; AMER, supra note 136, at 2-3; see also
BYRD, supra note 136, at 312; DONALD A. RITCHIE, PRESS GALLERY 7-8 (1991) (discussing initial
decision by House members to open congressional proceedings to the press, as members
confronted both "their desire for newspaper coverage and their inability to control the substance of
the reporting").
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. See 2 STORY, supra note 128, § 835 ("No person can
doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each house to determine the rules of its own
proceedings. If the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business
of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order.").
143. See Walter Kravitz, Evolution of the Senate's Committee System, in CHANGING
CONGRESS: THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 27, 28 (Norman J. Ornstein ed., 1974) [hereinafter
CHANGING CONGRESS]; DAVID T. CANON ET AL., I COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, 1789-
1946 xxxviii (2002).
144. See STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 10-12
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Between 1789 and 1820, however, the House and Senate shifted from
relying on temporary select committees to relying on permanent standing
committees that were created to shape the priorities and agenda of each
chamber.14 5 The change has been attributed to multiple factors, including the
inconvenience of constantly creating new ad hoc bodies, the uneven workload
distribution among members, the failure to take sufficient advantage of subject
matter expertise possessed by individual legislators, and the need for a more
effective Congress to address the problems of an expanding nation and to
counteract the growing influence of the President.146 This permanent standing
committee approach-in which bills are reviewed and reported before full
chamber consideration-was also a novel legislative design feature. It differs
dramatically from the British Parliament's committee structure, which to this
day relies on standing committees that lack permanent subject-matter
jurisdiction, that are without continuing membership, and that consider a bill in
detail only after a vote approving the measure in principle by the full House. 14 7
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Congress continued to
address the importance of reporting on floor debates and relying on standing
committees. 148 By the 1840s, a series of commercial printers employed by
(1984); see also CANON ET AL., supra note 143, at xxxviii; Kravitz supra note 143, at 29; United
States Senate - Senate Committees, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
briefing/Committees.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Senate Committees].
145. See CANON ET. AL., supra note 143, at xxxix-xl; WILLIAM L. MORROW,
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 14-15 (1969); Nelson W. Polsby, The Institutionalization of the
U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 144, 153-56 (1968); Senate Committees,
supra note 144.
146. See CANON ET. AL., supra note 143, at xxxix-xl; MORROW, supra note 144 at 14-15;
Polsby, supra note 145, at 154-55; Kravitz, supra note 143, at 29-30; Senate Committees, supra
note 144.
147. See James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by
the House ofLords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 1, 40-42 (2007); see also Garrison
Nelson, Assessing the Congressional Committee System: Contributions from a Comparative
Perspective, in CHANGING CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 120, 123-24. See generally RALPH
VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE 1825 3-5
(1917) (discussing how standing committees were used to a limited extent in Parliament in late
sixteenth century but had ceased to be a factor in legislative work well before American
independence). The colonial and early state legislatures relied on a mix of tightly controlled select
committees and preliminary versions of standing committees; the latter may well have influenced
the creation of permanent standing committees in Congress. See LAUROs G. MCCONACHIE,
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 17-25 (1898); PEVERILL SQUIRE & KEITH E. HAMM, 101
CHAMBERS: CONGRESS, STATE LEGISLATURES, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 106
(2005).
148. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at 32-50 (discussing recurrent floor debates in
House from 1800 to 1827, in which proposed and enacted Rules emphasized the need for accurate
reporting of floor debates); RITCHIE, supra note 141, at 12-30 (describing rise of officially
designated printers of House and Senate debates, along with small cohort of regular reporters on
floor proceedings); see also MCCONACHIE, supra note 147, at 97, 124-38 (describing expansive
and growing influence of standing committees from 1815 to 1850); Thomas F. Broden, Jr.,
Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 209, 226-30
(1968) (describing development of detailed and informative committee reports between 1820s and
2010] 1221
HeinOnline  -- 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1221 2010
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Congress had moved toward verbatim and nonpartisan accounts of floor
discussion, with a congressional requirement that legislators receive copies of
these published reports.149 After 1873, when the Government Printing Office
began publishing the Congressional Record, there was a complete and
comprehensive method for recording congressional proceedings and debates.' 50
Publication of and member reliance on standing committee reports also
dates from the early and mid 1800s. By 1830, detailed House committee reports
were often invoked during floor debates.' ' Although many reports
accompanying committee bills were delivered orally by committee chairs or
floor managers, written reports became prevalent in the House between 1830
and 1860.152 The Senate followed slightly behind the House in creating and
relying on written standing committee reports, but by 1900 committee reports
accompanied bills recommended for full consideration in both chambers as a
matter of rule or custom.153
3. The Constitutional Foundation ofLegislative History as an Interpretive
Resource
Legislative record documents, developed pursuant to the provisions of
Article I, were originally created primarily to keep the public informed.154 But
from an early point, representatives and senators also understood the
importance of these documents for keeping themselves informed, enabling
members to vote more intelligently and responsibly on policy measures
considered by the full body. 5 5 It therefore is not surprising that by the time of
Civil War).
149. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at 51; see also BYRD, supra note 136, at 314;
RITCHIE, supra note 141, at 29-30; McPherson, supra note 137, at 146-47; AMER, supra note 136,
at 4-5.
150. See AMER, supra note 136, at 5-6; Senate Historical Office, supra note 131, at 2.
151. See MCCONACHIE, supra note 147, at 60, 400-01; Broden, supra note 148, at 228.
152. See Broden, supra note 148, at 229.
153. See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE 281 (2003) (dating
House requirement from 1880); Broden, supra note 148, at 238 (dating Senate majority practice
from 1900). See generally WoODROw WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 90-91 (Meridan
Books 1973) (1885) (contrasting British system, which relies on majority party cabinet as a
"single standing committee that is charged with the origination of legislation," with American
system, which relies on "a [series of] Standing Committee[s], drawn from both parties, for the
consideration of each topic of legislation").
154. See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., MCCONACHIE, supra note 147, at 60 (reporting a House member's statement
in 1829 that printed committee reports were for the enlightenment of the House as well as public
opinion); WILSON, supra note 153, at 71 (observing that "[a] Committee is commissioned, not to
instruct the public, but to instruct and guide the House"); JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH 148, 155-57 (1891) (discussing how members rely heavily on reports from
standing committees to guide and shape their positions); see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at
32-33 (reporting House member's statement in 1800, emphasizing that the reasons behind
legislators' conduct "should be clearly understood in order that their measures might be
comprehended and their motives known," quite apart from enabling their constituents to "judge
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the Civil War and Reconstruction, Congress had ordered daily publication and
delivery of full chamber proceedings to all members,' 5 6 and distribution of
committee reports to members had become prevalent.' 57
This evolution in the role of legislative record documents is relevant to the
judicial branch role as well. The processes of our representative democracy
regularly involve bill introduction followed by discussion and crafting of
compromise language to overcome procedural obstacles and secure legislator
approval. 58 Legislative deals or bargains are a well-recognized feature of
American lawmaking, and legislative history often helps illuminate the
existence of a compromise or explain subtle aspects of the bargain.159 That
explanation is valuable for members as they decide how to vote, and also for
executive branch agencies and sophisticated members of the public-watchdog
groups, regulated entities, and their attorneys-as they decide how to conform
their own conduct.1so Accordingly, just as the Founders wanted the public to
have a record so they could understand what "their Agents are doing or have
done,"l61 so members from the earliest Congresses onward have relied on
standing committees to shape their legislative agendas and have sought access
to information produced by these standing committees. Members' appreciation
for the role of the legislative record in helping them to understand the nature of
whether they had faithfully discharged their duty"); supra text accompanying note 139 (reporting
Rep. Gerry's statement in 1792 that documentation of floor debates would help executive branch
to administer the laws and would aid the courts in interpreting these laws).
156. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
158. See RICHARDSON, supra note 123, at 204; see also ALAN GRANT, THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL PROCESS 45-52, 65-66, 302 (5th ed. 1994); Brudney, supra note 147, at 45-46.
159. See, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622-23 (2004); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 250-63, 280, 286 (1994); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices'
Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 117, 146-53 (2008).
160. See Broden, supra note 148, at 209-10, 214; James J. Brudney, Intentionalism's
Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1011-12 (2007) (discussing ex ante value of committee
reports for members and ex post value for lobbyists, press, and public). The Constitution also
references the President's need for guidance from executive department officers. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1. This in turn relates to the President's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." Id. § 3. Although the requirement of faithful execution principally reflected a
concern to prohibit the President from suspending laws that had been enacted, some participants
understood the provision also to require executive interpretation of inconclusive text. See 4 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 128, at 123, 126 (quoting a Letter from William Symmes
to Captain Peter Osgood, Nov. 15, 1787, during Massachusetts Ratifying Convention: "Can we
exactly say . . . what may be called or comprehended in a faithful execution? . . . . Should a
Federal law happen to be as generally expressed as the President's authority; must he not interpret
the Act! For in many cases he must execute the laws independent of any judicial decision."). See
generally Mashaw & Perry, supra note 12 (analyzing early examples of agency statutory
interpretation); Mashaw, supra note 12 (analyzing early examples of agency statutory
interpretation).
161. James Wilson, Statement at the Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 128, at 291.
2010] 1223
HeinOnline  -- 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1223 2010
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
legislative bargains, and the meaning of text on which they will vote, remains
robust to this day.16 2 The federal courts-charged with resolving disputes about
the meaning of often-complex regulatory compromises-have a historically
grounded responsibility to examine the same record for parallel reasons.' 6 3
It does not follow from this constitutional foundation that courts should
rely on legislative history in all or even most settings. There remain numerous
instances in which the legislative record is vague, silent, or suspect, and also
instances where other resources (Supreme Court precedent, agency guidance,
even canons) have superior probative value. Still, the existence of its
constitutionally and functionally linked origins confers upon legislative history
an element of authoritative legitimacy that enhances its stature as an
interpretive asset. This legitimacy is something legislative history skeptics have
largely ignored.
4. The Canons and Lawmaking Realities
The canons lack the constitutional imprimatur possessed by legislative
history. Their contributions, and indeed their existence, were not anticipated as
part of the federal lawmaking structure. '6 The pragmatic perspectives of
modem legislators and their staffs reinforce this constitutional silence. It is
understood that today's members of Congress are basically unaware of the
canons' existence, much less their role in judicial construction of statutes.'6 5
Perhaps as important, available empirical evidence indicates that canons are at
best a peripheral drafting asset, rarely invoked by committee staff or legislative
counsel when composing and negotiating over text.166
162. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1292 & n.249 (referencing multiple
statements from Republican and Democratic legislators since late 1980s).
163. Professor Vermeule has suggested that the Journal Clause's goal of promoting
transparency in the lawmaking process may be frustrated because most of the real legislative
bargaining occurs in less accessible venues such as off the floor or in closed markup sessions. See
Vermeule, supra note 130, at 413. In practice, however, much of the bargaining must be
sufficiently public to attract other members who are undecided. Further, even bargaining that is
secret must be recognized or recorded in order for the terms of the bargain to be clear enough so
that others can be persuaded to sign on. Staged floor colloquies and conference report statements
of the bill managers are often examples of this kind of record.
164. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
165. See Posner, supra note 80, at 806; see also Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the
Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO.
L.J. 653, 662-65 (1992); Eric Lane, Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in
Contrasts, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV. 639, 651, 656 (1987); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing
Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 629-31 (1987). This is not altogether surprising, given that
roughly half the members are not lawyers and those who are have likely been away from legal
practice for many years. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy and Dispute Resolution:
The Declining Influence ofLawyer-Statesman Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5 NEv. L.J. 479,
484 (2005); James Salzer, Lack ofLawyer-Legislators May Help Tort Reform Pass, ATLANTA J. -
CoNsT., Mar. 27, 2003, at DI.
166. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 597-605 (describing views of committee staffers
and legislative counsel); Breyer, supra note 67, at 870-71 (questioning whether legislators are
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The lawmaking enterprise's lack of reliance on the canons makes sense
from an institutional perspective. Legislators and staff draft statutes as part of
an effort to generate consensus from the divergences and disagreements that are
constitutive of American politics. Their goal is creating agreement sufficient to
secure enactment, not with a primary focus on grammatical or lexigraphic
clarity.167 That canons are of minimal relevance in the drafting process, and
lack the constitutional grounding of legislative history, does not mean they lack
institutional value as objective mechanisms for resolving disputes about the
application of statutory text-if indeed they are objective. But it turns out that
canons are inferior to both legislative history and agency guidance from the
standpoint of objectivity as well.
C. Objective Reliability
Statutes are a form of communication. They are a privileged form because
the Constitution authorizes Congress alone to prescribe legislative rules of
general applicability that help structure and guide public behavior. 16 As a form
of communication, statutes are not self-explanatory: interpretation is needed to
translate enacted language and give it meaning in real-life settings.169 Because
the consequences of statutory interpretation are so substantial in shaping human
conduct, we expect this interpretation to be reliable-to be based on "rule"-like
or "standard"-like directives that are more objective than subjective. 170
There is considerable debate over the comparative virtues of rules and
standards as interpretive approaches. Rules are often justified as offering
greater certainty while standards are praised as being responsive to changes in
the legal landscape.'71 Despite these differences, proponents of both rules and
aided by knowledge that court-produced canons may govern future legislation, given a less-than-
efficient legislative process characterized by partisan and decentralized bargaining); see also
Robert A. Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Communication
Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 GEo. L.J. 2189, 2192-93 (1997) (reporting
that congressional committees are largely unaware of appellate court decisions construing
statutory text); Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for "Statutory
Housekeeping": Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 131, 140
(2007) (discussing project to make Legislative Counsel in House and Senate more aware of basic
rules and conventions when drafting legislation).
167. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 594-600, 614-16; Lane, supra note 165, at
657.
168. See, e.g., Boudreau et al., supra note 67, at 961-71; Solan, supra note 115, at 444-49.
169. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1089.
170. For an overview on the difference between rules and standards as legal directives, see
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
57-62 (1992). For discussion of how the distinction between rules and standards may be best
understood as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, see, for example, Jules L. Coleman, Rules
and Social Facts, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703, 711-15 (1991); Michael S. Moore, Three
Concepts ofRules, 14 HARv. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 771, 794 (1991).
171. See generally Sullivan, supra note 170, at 62 (discussing utility of rules); id at 66
(discussing utility of standards); see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 577, 590-92 (1988) (discussing arguments favoring rule-like directives); id. at
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standards embrace a core element of objectivity as part of their approaches. An
objective framework is valued in part because it offers a measure of
transparency, allowing us to observe and criticize the basis of interpretive
judgments reached by courts or agencies. Relatedly, an objective structure
imposes a measure of constraint on the discretion exercised by these
interpreters.172 The law passed by Congress is not simply whatever courts or
agencies say it means or want it to mean: rather, it is the best approximation of
what Congress itself meant it to mean.
Applying this preference for a core of objectivity to the interpretive assets
of our three branches, the canons come out in third place. The Supreme Court's
interpretive rubric has given rise to a fairly well-settled hierarchy of resources
with respect to legislative history and a comparable framework for assessing
different forms of agency guidance. These hierarchies, recognized by legal
scholars and utilized by federal judges, have no parallel when it comes to the
canons.
1. Legislative History
The hierarchy of reliable legislative history sources is tied to the structure
of congressional lawmaking. Standing committee and conference committee
reports are ranked at the top based on the central role of committees in
formulating, justifying, and negotiating about text.174 They are regarded as
capturing well-informed thought about what the proposed legislation is meant
to accomplish, in a format that is both accessible and readily understandable.' 75
Explanatory floor statements by bill sponsors or managers are deemed almost
as reliable,176 while legislative inaction, statements by non-legislative
drafters-especially those on the losing side-and post-enactment history are
arrayed toward the other end of the authoritative hierarchy.177 These rankings
592-93 (discussing arguments favoring standards-like directives).
172. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1179-80(1989).
173. See BREYER, supra note 115, at 85-88; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219-20, 231
(2d ed. 2006).
174. See ESKRIDGE ET. AL., supra note 173, at 311-12; GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at
173; William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636-37 (1990); see
also Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
175. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 981-82; see also Schwegemann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
176. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1000; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 173, at 312;
GREENWALT, supra note 46, at 173; Eskridge, supra note 174, at 636-38; see also North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524-27 (1982).
177. Various sources have discussed the lesser authoritative status of legislative inaction
and post-enactment history. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S.
102, 117-18 (1980) (post-enactment history); CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1061, 1040 (legislative
inaction and post-enactment history); John Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for
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are strong presumptions rather than hard rules: committee reports may be less
reliable for certain reasons, 178 and legislative inaction or post-enactment history
may be more reliable in certain circumstances.1 79 Of central importance,
however, is that departures from the presumptions also have rational
explanations grounded in the realities of Congress's lawmaking processes. 80
Underlying these presumptions and exceptions is a standard for reliability
based on how Congress's designated agents-or a bill's most influential
supporters and opponents-fulfill their communicative function to their
colleagues while navigating the challenges of a contingent political process.
Courts are attempting to invoke the best evidence of "consensus within the
legislature that can be routinely discerned" 18 1 or the evidence that is deemed to
have been noticed, understood, and endorsed by a reasonable legislator.182 This
reliability standard reflects a degree of imputation to what, paraphrasing Justice
Scalia, "by a benign fiction [the judicial interpreter] assume[s] Congress always
has in mind., 183 The imputation in turn rests on a hierarchy of resources that
corresponds to the actual practices of congressional lawmaking.
Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984)
(legislative inaction and post-enactment history). On the lesser authority of floor statements by bill
opponents and by supporters outside the enacting coalition, see, for example, ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 173, at 313 and GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 173 (statements by bill opponents).
See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 175 (listing a full hierarchy, ascribed to Eskridge);
ESKRIDGE, supra note 174, at 636-40 (setting forth full hierarchy).
178. Committee reports are of limited value when the provision in dispute has been added
to the bill as a floor amendment, or when the report's commentary on a provision is as
inconclusive as the text itself. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 982; see also Brudney, supra note
122, at 94-97 (discussing why committee reports accompanying omnibus budget reconciliation
measures may often include untrustworthy commentary on isolated substantive law matters
inserted for strategic purposes).
179. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1048-49 (discussing instances in which Court
presumes that Congress has acquiesced in a high-profile or foundational interpretation by a federal
court or an authoritative agency, especially where Congress reenacts or amends a statute without
material changes to the provision in dispute); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 792, 804 n.4 (1998) (applying this "reenactment rule" exception to ascribe meaning to
legislative inaction); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (explaining that when
Congress reenacts a statute without change, it is presumed to be aware of and to adopt judicial
interpretations of the statute that preceded reenactment); Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) (relying on post-
enactment legislative history because interpretation of earlier statute was drafted by Congress's
designated experts on Conference Committee, it was explained to all members through floor
statements accompanying Conference Report, and it was relied on by members when voting on
the later bill); Brudney, supra note 122, at 90-91, 97-99 (discussing two instances in which post-
enactment legislative history was unusually reliable because it represented an integral part of the
shared understanding reached by Congress as a whole).
180. See supra notes 178-179.
181. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 173, at 304.
182. See Brudney, supra note 122, at 75-80.
183. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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2. Agency Guidance
Similarly, the Court has generated a fairly accessible hierarchy of
resources regarding the explanatory directives issued by the executive branch
about the meaning of inconclusive text. As with legislative history, the
touchstone for this executive branch hierarchy is certain realities of the
lawmaking process albeit from a different branch's vantage point.' 4 For
agency rules or rulings that Congress meant to carry the force of law, judicial
deference is at its highest level; as articulated in Chevron, the only question
with respect to inconclusive text is whether the agency interpretation is based
on a permissible construction of the statute. 85 For rules or rulings where
Congress did not authorize the agency to speak with the force of law, the Court
confers less generous judicial deference; it considers multiple factors when
evaluating the persuasiveness of agency judgments.' 6  Moreover, as
summarized in Skidmore, within the universe of what is persuasive there are
additional authoritative distinctions.' 87 Agency interpretations contempor-
aneous with enactment tend to be more respected than much later rulings, 88
while agency interpretations conflicting with earlier directives are less
respected than consistent interpretations. 1 Broadly circulated agency
interpretations are likely to garner more respect than private advisory
opinions,190 and agency interpretations in highly technical or specialized areas
tend to receive additional deference.' 9'
184. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1085 (2008) (describing and classifying Court's varying degrees of respect
for agency interpretations-from extremely strong deference in certain subject matter areas or
with respect to agency interpretation of its own regulations, to relatively weak deference with
regard to less formal or authoritative elaborations of a statutory scheme); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (discussing stronger deference
regime under Chevron doctrine and intermediate deference regime under Skidmore doctrine, and
explaining what sources of congressional law justify each approach).
185. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 184.
186. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1194-97, 1200-03,
1223-24 (discussing historical development of Court's agency deference standards).
187. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (referencing "the thoroughness evident in [an agency's]
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control").
188. See, e.g., BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 130-32 (1983); Sunray
Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 154 (1960). See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. &
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 496-97 (2d ed. 2001).
189. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976); Saxbe v.
Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 73 (1974). See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 188, at 498-99.
190. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (rejecting
deference to private Department of Labor opinion letter). See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra
note 188, at 502.
191. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624, 642-45 (1998) (deferring to expert medical
judgment). See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 115 (2d ed.
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These distinctions are not always observed-a recent empirical study of
Court practice since Chevron suggests a broad range of deference schemes
resulting in reduced levels of certainty.19 2 Notwithstanding such variations,
however, reliance on agency guidance continues to be situated in a larger
prioritized context.19 3 Departures from the deference standards are explained in
relatively objective terms as well-by reference to the agency's own failure to
act consistently or to offer adequate reasons or respond to prior judicial
invitations.194 Further, as was true for the Court's rubric on legislative history,
the underlying framework is itself grounded in certain lawmaking realities-
such as whether Congress has authorized the agency to speak with the force of
law, how well the agency's conduct conforms to the essentials of due process,
or the extent to which agency action rests on special subject matter expertise.
Agencies garner respect and deference based on this framework in a reasonably
consistent and broadly predictable way.
3. Canons
In contrast to legislative history and agency guidance, the Court has not
developed an architecture of authoritative priorities for the canons. The absence
of such a framework is due in large measure to the inherent imprecisions of the
English language. Because words are "inexact symbols"l 95 of meaning, they
often cannot be properly understood without reference to the context or
community from which they emerge.' 96 Thus, for instance, whether a party's
position in court is "substantially justified"' 97 or a plant closing is "reasonably
foreseeable" 198 are not matters that can be resolved solely by reliance on
ordinary meaning or semantic analysis.
Sixty years ago, Professor Karl Llewellyn succinctly described how the
canons so often point in opposite directions with respect to the ambiguities-
1997).
192. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 184; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein,
Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 831-47 (2006) (demonstrating that Court's invocation of Chevron doctrine from 1989 to
2005 reflects Justices' ideological preferences when deciding whether to defer to agency rulings).
193. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 184; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 184.
194. See, e.g., Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB 931 F.2d 924, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990) (referencing agency's failure to offer
adequate reasons); see also Lee Lumber v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(referencing agency's failure to respond to prior judicial invitations).
195. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 528 (1947).
196. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 251 & n.82 (1990).
197. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2006); see Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552 (1988).
198. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A)
(2006); see Pena v. Am. Meat Packing Co., 362 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2004).
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and also the gaps-that abound in the texts enacted by Congress.' 99 In the
ensuing decades, many scholars and judges have come to recognize that efforts
to promote a canonical framework for interpreting statutes rest on the beguiling
yet false assumptions that Congress regularly strives for structural coherence
and linguistic consistency when drafting laws, and that such coherence and
consistency can be readily discerned in its final products.2 00 As Frickey and
others have observed, the congressional drafting process is politically rather
than linguistically oriented.20 ' And the Court's decisions provide ample
evidence that Congress's complex statutory schemes-revised and extended
over many years-produce linguistic residues, redactions, and repetitions that
generate reasonable divergent understandings of how canons such as the whole
act rule or expressio unius should apply,202 or of whether one verb in a
sequence of verbs should be construed as distinctive to "avoid surplusage" or as
indistinct to comport with noscitur a sociis. 203
Nor do the scores of judicial policy preferences set forth in substantive
canons and deftly catalogued by Frickey lend themselves to the development of
a systemic framework or design. Certain substantive canons are rather open-
ended while others convey a more precise prescriptive message.204 Some
canons are based on generally applicable legal principles while others are
grounded in specific subject matter policies.205 Courts that promote this array of
199. See Karl L. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
200. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of
Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND L. REV. 579, 580 (1992) (critical of
presumption "that a statute is primarily a linguistic artifact"); Buzbee, supra note 86, at 234
(critical of counterfactual assumptions about omniscient legislators in drafting process); see also
POSNER, supra note 115, at 277-82 (describing as "wholly unrealistic" the assumption that
Congress is omniscient in its linguistic drafting process).
201. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing Frickey's observations);
supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text (discussing observations by other scholars).
202. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 836-37, 842-43 (1988)
(disagreement between White, J., and Kennedy, J., over how whole act rule should apply); Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59, 462-65 (1892) (acknowledging direct
conflict between expressio unius and whole act rule when construing 1885 Immigration Act). See
generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 103-05 (discussing systemic malleability of
language canons).
203. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98,
702, 719-21 (1995) (disagreement between Stevens & Scalia, JJ., as to whether whole act rule or
noscitur a sociis controls); see also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 162-63, 177-78 (1981)
(disagreement between Stewart & Brennan, JJ., as to whether expressio unius or in pari materia
should control meaning of text).
204. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 105-06 (contrasting open-ended canons. like
constitutional avoidance, and presumption against implied repeals, which offer only vague
guidance to Congress, with specific canons like presumptions against asserting extraterritorial
jurisdiction or abrogating states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
205. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1268 (contrasting generally applicable legal
principles such as rules disfavoring federal preemption of core state functions or implied waivers
of sovereign immunity with specific subject matter policies such as presumptions favoring labor
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substantive values and preferences inevitably waver as to whether the preferen-
ces should be applied as tiebreakers, presumptions, or clear statement rules.206
In theory, a coherent architecture could be developed by specifying certain
canons as taking automatic or presumptive precedence over others, or by
providing safe harbor-type formulations for what satisfies a particular language
or substantive canon.207 Unlike priorities developed with respect to legislative
history and agency guidance, however, these judgments would not be grounded
in the realities of how federal laws are enacted or implemented. Moreover,
although another linguistic resource-the dictionary-includes certain arguably
objective indicia of authoritative priority,208 canons as maxims created by
courts and invoked for their own use lack such extrinsic or objective indicators.
The Court's failure to develop any interpretive rubric for prioritizing or
ordering its reliance on different canons may well stem from an implicit
understanding that such a creation would be both arbitrary and unproductive.
My reservations about objectivity are not meant to suggest that canons are
incapable of situationally valuable application. Moreover, beyond specific
applications, the Court may rely on canons for somewhat different functions in
20distinct subject areas209 and individual Justices may place varying emphasis on
particular canons based on how they wish to promote dialogue with the other
branches. 2 10 Still, the absence of any broad-based interpretive rubric or
framework means the canons are unable to establish an adequately objective
presence. Accordingly, although some judicial discretion is essential and
indeed salutary for the interpretive enterprise, judges who regularly rely on the
canons have license to employ a systemic kind of discretion, in contrast to
arbitration or disfavoring implied tax exemptions).
206. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 106 (discussing cases); Note, supra note 66,
at 1612-13 (discussing Court's evenly divided record on cases involving federal preemption
canon from 1983 to 2004).
207. Professor Rosenkranz suggests that Congress might establish these canonical priorities
legislatively (see Rosenkranz, supra note 121, at 2148-50), but comparable options are
presumably open to the Court.
208. See generally Samuel A. Thumma & Jefferey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has
Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
227, 267-76 (1999) (discussing Court's need to choose between general usage and more technical
dictionaries; between dictionaries produced by different "authors"; between different editions of
the same dictionary; and between different-generally prioritized-definitions of the word in
question). Admittedly, the Justices have been criticized for a largely subjective and often chaotic
reliance on dictionaries since usage expanded in the 1980s. See id. at 264-76; Note, Looking It
Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1437, 1445-49 (2007). Still,
the Court could establish strong presumptions with respect to dictionary usage-e.g., announcing
a preference for Webster's International, for editions in place when the litigation arose (as
opposed to when the law was enacted), and for a word's primary definition (as opposed to
secondary or tertiary definitions). See Rosenkranz, supra note 121, at 2147-48 (proposing that
Congress adopt a similar approach).
209. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1266-70, 1294-1300 (tax law versus
workplace law).
210. See Brudney, supra note 120, at 913-22 (discussing approach of Justice Ginsburg).
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judges who regularly invoke legislative history or agency deference. We should
worry about this systemic discretion, especially given the efforts of some
judges and scholars to enshrine the canons as an institutionally objective
interpretive asset. Rather than enshrine them, we ought to limit the untethered
role played by the canons, making them interstitial in comparison to the more
anchored interpretive assets.
CONCLUSION
No one has done more to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the
canons than Phil Frickey. His critical perspective and measured justifications
convey both an appreciation for the canons' value in particular settings and a
skepticism regarding claims that they deserve elevated status. In addition,
Frickey's insights have focused attention on the canons' institutional role in
promoting policies favored by the judicial branch-notably an interest in
encouraging more efficient legislative drafting and in protecting what the Court
views as underenforced constitutional norms.
This Essay has extended Frickey's institutional perspective by identifying
particular concerns about the canons in contrast to interpretive assets produced
by the other two branches. Although not the only recent effort to suggest a
more limited role for the canons,2 1 1 the Essay does so by examining certain
normative attributes associated especially with legislative history but not with
the canons.212 Some readers may question the failure to address potentially
relevant criticism of legislative history-that it is systemically unreliable
because opportunistically created by members of Congress or their staffs or
because selectively invoked by judges to help justify their preferred policy
results.213 These criticisms deserve an in-depth response, but I have offered that
214 215
response in previous articles and others have done so as well. I have
211. See ELHAUGE, supra note 12, at 9-12, 151-52 (contending that canons occupy a third-
tier position as preference-eliciting default rules). For critical perspective on Elhauge, see Garrett,
supra note 75, at 2124-28.
212. Cf Thomas Merrill, Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,
372 (1994) (critical of textualism as an exercise in judicial ingenuity, in contrast to the more
grounded archaeological approach taken by intentionalism).
213. On the critique of legislative history as strategically planted or opportunistically
created, see, for example, Eskridge, supra note 174, at 643-44; Barry R. Weingast & William J.
Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislators, Like Firms, Are Not
Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. EcON. 132, 148-52 (1988); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87,
99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). On the critique of legislative history as selectively and
subjectively invoked by judges, see, for example, GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 181 and
Kozinski, supra note 116, at 813.
214. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 122, at 47-60 (explaining why, notwithstanding
anecdotal exceptions, legislative history is neither corruptly produced nor unrepresentative of the
larger body); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 159, at 131-60 (demonstrating empirically that for
the universe of statutory workplace law decisions between 1969 and 2006, liberal Justices did not
invoke legislative history to favor their own policy preferences).
215. See, e.g., George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
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resisted the temptation to reprise or highlight those responsive positions given
the prescribed limitations of the Essay format.
For nearly two decades, textualist judges and scholars have effectively
framed the constitutional and policy debate about statutory interpretation. It
may now be time for the terms of that debate to shift toward greater respect for
the role of interpretive resources generated by the political branches.
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative
History, 1990 DuKE L.J. 39, 60-73; Eskridge, supra note 174, at 636-40; Charles Tiefer, The
Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 264-70
(2000).
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